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COMMENTS ON AKHIL REED AMAR'S THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREA TION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Melvin I. Urofsky*
I am pleased to see that Professor Akhil Reed Amar is following in a long and
worthy tradition. For much of this century, the Harvard Law School has been
dominated by Felix Frankfurter, his acolytes, and disciples. While they either
preached judicial restraint or, after Justice Frankfurter was appointed to the United
States Supreme Court in 1939, defended his often indefensible opinions, they all had
one thing in common-bad writing. Justice Frankfurter's opinions, or to be more
accurate, law review articles masquerading as judicial opinions, may have been well-
reasoned and carefully researched, but they had an inevitable propensity to put the
reader to sleep after the third sub-paragraph.
However, a short distance down 1-95 stood the Yale Law School, which, ever
since the rise of the Legal Realists in the 1920s, has been known for the elegance of
its writing. Walton Hamilton, Thurman Arnold, and Jerome Frank could write circles
around their counterparts at Harvard and Columbia.2 Perhaps the most luminous
piece of legal writing in the first half ofthis century, Benjamin Cardozo's The Nature
of the Judicial Process, was given as the Storrs Lecture at Yale.3 Alexander Bickel,
Harvard-trained and indoctrinated by Justice Frankfurter, wrote too well for the
people at Cambridge, and he did his greatest work at Yale.4 In recent years, there
have been Robert Burt, Bruce Ackerman, and Akhil Reed Amar.5 Even if one does
* Professor Urofsky is currently the director of the doctoral program in Public Policy
and Administration and is also professor of constitutional history at Virginia
Commonwealth University. He holds baccalaureate, masters, and doctoral degrees from
Columbia University and ajuris doctor from the University of Virgina.
' See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2 See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL: A DISSENTING LAWYER'S
LIFE (1965); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); JERmONE
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949); JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); WALTON HAMILTON, THE POLITICS OF
COMPETITION (1940); WALTON HAMILTON, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY (1957).
3 See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
4 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
5 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1998); ROBERT A. BURT,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES:
OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988).
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not agree with their arguments, one can at least savor the joy of well-written, if at
times wrong-headed, prose.
At this point, Professor Amar is probably saying to himself, "This is the set up.
He has not come to praise me, but to bury me, and the knife is about to appear." If
this were an ordinary panel, and Amar's The Bill of Rights6 an ordinary book, that
would be true. Panelists are invited on the assumption that they will tear into the
author's argument, resulting in a sort of intellectual throwing of the author to the
lions (we panelists) for the delectation of the roaring mob (you readers) in the
coliseum (this room-use your imaginations!).
Alas, I must disappoint this expectation. I do, in fact, disagree with a few of
Amar's minor arguments. The characterization of contemporary rights as counter-
majoritarian is true only in a limited fashion. It is clear that some of the great cases
involving speech, press, and rights of the accused have dealt with people who, to put
it charitably, are the dregs of society.7 Yet privacy, for example, is a right that the
majority sees as belonging to its members as well as to those of outlandish groups.
During the debate overthe confirmation of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court,
his opposition to a constitutionally protected right of privacy offended one group that
the Reagan administration had clearly counted on to support Bork-white
southerners, especially women. Polls showed that southern white women were among
the strongest advocates of a right to privacy, and they feared that Bork's presence on
the Court would undermine their rights!
I have no intention of nit-picking, however, for Amar's major theses have quite
convinced me. Rather, I want to look at some of the implications of those
theses-and I do mean theses, plural.
Amar's book contains two overt theses, and one that is understated but still quite
important. In his first thesis, Amar argues that to understand the first ten
amendments to the Constitution, we have to give up our contemporary habit of seeing
them through the lens of counter-majoritarian protection." In other words, forget all
of the great cases we studied in law school, and go back to 1789 to understand the
creation and ratification of those.amendments in the context of the times.
If we do that, the key phrase to keep in mind is the majestic opening of the
Constitution itself, "We the People of the United States," for the amendments ground
themselves in both a populism that sees the fount of all sovereignty as the people
itself, as well as a federalism that is also grounded in populism. There is a fear of
6 AHKiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
' Consider, as just two examples, Ernesto Miranda, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436,492 (1966), and Clarence Earl Gideon, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-
37 (1963).
s See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA (1989).
" See AMAR, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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central government, and a belief that the government closest to the people, at this time
the states, would be most protective of the rights of the people. The various
protections should be seen not as individualistic, but as popular, protecting the people
as a whole against the feared depredations of a central authoritarian government, the
experience of which remained vivid in the minds of the Framers as well as the
Ratifiers.
Beyond that, the amendments closely track the scheme laid out in the body of the
Constitution itself, and so we have to look at these amendments as structural, that is,
as part of the governmental framework. They were intended not to protect individual
rights, but rather to serve as part of the larger purpose of protecting the people as a
whole against government by a small authoritarian elite. To use a modem idiom, they
were there to control agency costs. Above all, the Framers designed them to limit the
powers of the central government while bolstering the discretion and authority of the
states.
What happens, then, to convert rights that sound in populism to those that sound
in individualism? How was the Establishment Clause ofthe First Amendment, which
Amar argues specifically permitted the states to establish churches, ° turned on its
head to prohibit states from doing what had originally been a preserved power? How
did the whole notion of a Bill of Rights protecting the people in the states against the
federal government get turned around to protect individuals against the states?
The answer is incorporation, and in Part II of the book, Amar makes what is to
me a convincing case that Jonathan Bingham and his colleagues who drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, did in
fact mean to incorporate the first eight amendments and apply them to the states."
While Amar does not agree with Hugo Black's "jot for jot" theory of incorporation
and rightly dismisses the Frankfurter view of "fundamental fairness" as a basis for
incorporation, his end result is that, with a few exceptions, the first eight amendments
ought to apply to the states, in light of what the Reconstructors of 1866 intended.'"
Here we have the two basic theses of Amar's book. First, that we need to read
the first ten amendments as a structural addition to the Constitution, and that the
rights enumerated sound in populism and states' rights federalism, not individualism.
Second, that the aim of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate these rights
and to make them individual, and that in 1868 the states and not the federal
government were seen as the chief danger against "the people."
There is a third thesis as well. About two years ago, I received a call from the
Cumberland Law School, inviting me to be on a panel. Professor Lawrence Friedman
was scheduled to give a lecture on his new book, Crime andPunishment in American
'o See id. at 33-34.
" See id. at 164-672
2 See id.
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History,3 and I was asked to speak for a few minutes on how such works of history
affected judges.' In my comments, I suggested that judges, even those with some
knowledge of and appreciation for history, rarely utilize the works of scholars unless
it suits their jurisprudential needs.'5 There is a fine book by Charles Miller on this
issue, '6 and, of course, there is the questionable use of bad history on Chief Justice
Rehnquist's part every time he wants to uphold some form of state subsidy to
religious institutions.'7
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas all have a very static view of the
Constitution in general, and of the Bill of Rights in particular. Yet, more than anyone
else on the current Court, the Chief Justice uses a sort of frozen time-frame in which
to explicate the meaning of rights. As an example, take his opinion for the majority
in the assisted suicide cases decided in 1997. 8 In an extremely mechanistic way, he
asked whether physician-assisted suicide was considered a right at the time of the
original framing of the Constitution or in the 1860s when the Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted and ratified.' 9 Finding no such right existed at the time, the Court found
that it did not exist now. Q.E.D., the Second and Ninth Circuits' decisions were
reversed.20
This mechanical reading proved too much for five members of the Court who
entered concurrences disagreeing in whole or in part with the Chief Justice's
reasoning. I commend to you especially Justice Souter's nuanced reading of the
'3 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993).
'4 I was about to say I could give them the answer to that in two seconds when they told
me of the honorarium. I quickly did some math in my head and figured out that even if I
spoke for the full ten minutes they wanted, I would be billing them at a higher hourly rate
than that charged by some of my law school classmates who now work on Wall Street. The
temptation proved too great, and so off I flew to Montgomery, Alabama.
s See Melvin I. Urofsky, Courts, Legislatures and History: Having Faith in Time, 27
CUMm. L. REV. 941, 942 (1997).
16 See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
17 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Madison thought the First Amendment prevented the establishment of a national
religion, but that it did not create a bar to complete government influence). According to
Leonard Levy, "Rehnquist wrote fiction and passed it off as history." LEONARD LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 155 (2d ed. 1994).
"S See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796 (1997) (overturning state laws permitting
assisted suicide in large measure because, according to the Court, the nation's history and
tradition did not grant such a right); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997)
(same).
9 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709-13.
20 The cases, the lower court decisions, and the Supreme Court opinions are analyzed
in Melvin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court andAssisted Suicide, 32
U. RICH. L. REV. 313 (1998).
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Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and his understanding that, over time,
rights may change in terms of what they mean and to whom they apply.'
It is this notion that I believe constitutes the third, and in some ways the most
important, thesis of Professor Amar's book. The debate has been a faulty one up
until now. On the one hand, we have the champions of original intent, arguing that
the Constitution and its amendments mean exactly what they meant at the time of
drafting and ratification-not one whit more or less. On the other side, we have those
who believe that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses not only incorporate the first eight amendments but implicitly update them
whenever necessary. The first group appeals to a rigid, static view of history, a view
that bears no relation to reality; the second appeals to common sense, but without
much historical evidence to support their claims.
Amar's work in showing how the popular understanding of rights changed
between 1789 and 1866, how rights grounded in a populist -federalism were
transformed into rights supportive of individualism, and how the specter of a strong
central authority waned and was replaced by fear of bigoted state governments,
reflects the dynamics of change over time.22 What it should do, although I am not at
all confident that it will, is make judges think a bit more carefully about how history
affects popular understanding of rights.
If we were to apply Amar's use of history to a subject in which I am very
interested, assisted suicide, it would be true that throughout much of the history of
western civilization for the past two millennia, suicide was frowned upon. It
eventually became a felony, with the suicide's goods forfeited to the crown.23
Assisting suicide meant assisting in the commission of a felony, and was thus, by
common law rules, a felony in itself. This remained the case down to the twentieth
century.
-During all of this time, medicine could do little other than providing temporary
relief to some ills. Surgery was non-existent until the late eighteenth century.
Antibiotics did not appear until the middle of the twentieth. Thus, a serious illness or
accident usually led to a quick death and most people died at home. Given this
21 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (Souter, J., concurring).
22 1 disagree with Professor Michael J. Klarman's contention that the Amar thesis is just
another form of originalism. See Michael J. Klarman, Remarks at the Institute of Bill of
Rights' Symposium on The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Jan. 21, 1999).
While Amar certainly looks to original intent to see the historical bases for the Bill of
Rights, he then makes it quite clear that the meaning of those rights has changed over time
and that we can not interpret the amendments solely on the basis of what they meant in
1791 or 1868. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 3-19.
2' See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 261-64
(1957); see also Hales v. Petit, 75 E.R. 387, 397-99 (1562) (holding that committing suicide
is unnatural).
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scenario, physician-assisted suicide did, in fact, make little sense and no one would
have listed it as one of those rights which Thomas Jefferson believed self-evident.
Yet, look at the state of medicine at the end of the twentieth century, with its
wonder drugs, surgical miracles, and machines that can keep the body "alive" even
when the brain is dead. Today, people die mostly in hospitals, and the gamut of tools
available to doctors can prolong that dying process for a long time. However, we still
cannot cure certain disease, and do not even understand others, such as ALS (Lou
Gehrig's disease). For people contracting these diseases, or left horribly crippled by
an accident, death may be welcome. If we believe that autonomy is a right enjoyed
by the people and by individuals, then perhaps the right to choose death, or even to
seek help in doing so, reflects not the perverse wishes of mental incompetents, but a
logical and historically justified transmogrification of what autonomy means.24
This may be taking Professor Amar's thesis well beyond where he is comfortable,
but I think that this brilliant and creative historical analysis has much to teach notjust
historians (who, of course, already appreciate history), but also law professors, who
by and large think history ought to be banished from law schools, and judges, for
whom notjust original intent, but also the changes thattake place subsequently, ought
to be part and parcel of the decision-making process.
So, Professor Amar, no long knives, but a heartfelt thank you. Your book not
only illuminates but instructs. Perhaps, if we are all lucky, it may even teach those
most in need of instruction.
24 See PETER G. FILENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE
RIGHT-TO-DIE IN AMERICA (1998).
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